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In recent years, state taxing authorities, in order to meet the con-
stantly rising costs of government, have sought additional sources of
revenue.' As a consequence, service personnel and their dependents
have become acutely aware of these quests for additional revenue,
particularly as they have been affected by state income and personal
property taxes.
2
With the advent of World War II, millions of service personnel,
because of frequent moves from state to state, became subject to the
income3 and personal property4 tax laws of more than one state in a
*Counsel, Litton System, Inc., Woodland Hills, California.
'State Tax News, 37 Taxes 554 (1959).
-See, e.g., Georgia revenue regulations in which servicemen are singled out
as a potential source of revenue. Ga. Rev. Reg. § 9 2- 3 002(i), CCH Inc., State Tax
Rep. Ga. § io-o62 (1956); see Army Times, December 4, 1963, P. 4, col. 1.
'See Buck Act, 61 Stat. 641 (1940), 4 U.S.C. § io6 (1958) which provides that
"No person shall be relieved from liability for any income tax levied by any State,
or by any duly constituted taxing authority therein having jurisdiction to levy such
a tax, by reason of his residency within a Federal area or receiving income from
such transactions occurring or services performed in such area; and such State or
taxing authority shall have full jurisdiction and power to levy and collect such tax
in any Federal area within such State and to the same extent and with the same ef-
fect as though such area was not a Federal area"; Public Salary Act, 53 Stat. 575
(1939), 5 U.S.C. § 84a (1958), which provides that "The United States hereby consents
to the taxation of compensation, received after December 31, 1938, for personal serv-
ices as an officer or employee of the United States, any territory or possession or po-
litical subdivision thereof, the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality
of any one or more of the foregoing, by any duly constituted taxing authority hav-
ing jurisdiction to tax such compensation, if such taxation does not discriminate
against such officer or employee because of the source of such compensation"; Graves
v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
""It has become universally recognized that tangible personal property may
be taxed in the state where it has an actual situs-where it is physically located....
The modem rule is that the actual situs of visible tangible property and not the
domicile of the owner determines the place of taxation." 5o Am. Jur. Taxation
§ 452 (1939); "The general rule is that the situs of intangible personal property
for the purpose of property taxation is at the domicile of the owner. But where
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single year.5 In recognition of the emergent problem of multiple tax-
ation, and in consonance with a tradition of assisting military per-
sonnel with their legal affairs,0 Congress enacted section 514 of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940.8 As amended in 1944,
this statute provides for the exemption of the serviceman's military
pay and personal property from taxation in the state of his tempo-
rary residence.9 The authority of the serviceman's domiciliary state
to tax has not been altered by this statute, however.10 Although section
514 brought a large measure of tax relief, it provides no protection
for the serviceman's dependents and still permits multiple taxation of
certain categories of his income and personal property."
Since the end of World War II, it has been necessary for the United
States to maintain a large military force. Because of existing world
conditions, it appears that such a force will be maintained during the
foreseeable future; and that members of this force and their depen-
dents will necessarily continue to move from state to state pursuant
to military orders. It appears equally certain that state taxing au-
thorities, in seeking every available source of revenue, will continue
their efforts to tax the income and personal property of these transient
servicemen and their dependents.
Against this background, the income and personal property tax
laws of a selected group of states, in which large concentrations of mili-
tary personnel are usually present, will be examined. 12 An effort will
be made to determine the application of these laws to the serviceman
and his dependents; to consider the effect of section 514 upon the ap-
intangible personal property has in fact a situs elsewhere than at the domicile of
its owner, it may be taxed in the jurisdiction of the situs." 51 Am. Jur. Taxation
§ 463 (1939).
'Hearings on H.R. 7029 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Military Affairs. 77th Cong. 2d Sess. 28 (1942).
OSee Skilton, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o and The
Amendments of 1942, 91 U. Pa. L. Rev. 177, 178 (1942), for a short history of
legislation passed during the Civil War and World War I to assist servicemen
with their legal problems.
7Section 17, 56 Stat. 777 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 754 (1958), hereinafter refer-
red to as § 514.
854 Stat. 1178 (194o), 50 U.S.C. App. § 5o1 (1958). This act will remain in effect
until terminated by subsequent act of Congress, § 14, 62 Stat. 623 (1948), as
amended § 1("), 64 Stat. 1074 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. § 464 (1958).
OSection 1, 58 Stat. 722 (1944), 5o U.S.C. App. § 574 (1958).
'°Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 326 (1953).
"See discussions regarding categories of income and personal property which
are not exempt from state taxation after n.34 and n.81 infra.
22Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma and Virginia.
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plication of these laws; and to identify areas of existing or potential
conflict between the interests of the taxing state and the interests
of the serviceman and his dependents.
Recommedations for changes in existing state and federal laws
will be made. These recommendations will reflect an attempt to bal-
ance the interests of the taxing state against the interests of the ser-
viceman and his dependents. The duty of the serviceman to pay taxes
will be stressed to the same extent as his right to be exempt from
taxation under certain circumstances.
II
APPLICATION OF STATE TAX LAWS TO SERVICEMEN
AND THEIR DEPENDENTS
A. Income Tax
i. Authority of the states to tax income.
It is well recognized that a state may constitutionally tax a resi-
dent or domiciliary on income earned from sources within the state
as well as on income earned from sources outside the state.13 It is also
recognized that a state may impose a tax on the income of a nonresi-
dent derived from proper.ty owned within the state, or from any busi-
ness, trade or profession carried on within the state;14 but a state
does not have the constitutional authority to impose a tax on the in-
come of a nonresident derived from business, property or services per-
formed outside the state.' 5 Although the United States Supreme Court
has not defined the limits of a state's authority to declare a non-domi-
ciliary to be a resident for income tax purposes, it is believed that any
equitable basis, such as having a place of abode within a state or
spending a substantial period of time within such state will suffice.'(
Since there is no constitutional bar on the ground of double tax-
ation,17 it is apparent that in a particular case, income taxes, under the
'Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19 (1938); Lawrence v. State Tax
Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1931).
'New York ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
'-'Newport Co. v. Tax Commission, 219 Wis. 293, 261 N.W. 884 (1935), cert.
denied, 297 U.S. 720 (1936); People ex rel. Stafford v. Travis, 231 N.Y. 339, 132
N.E. 1o9 (1921); see also Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
"6People ex rel. Ryan v. Lynch, 233 N.Y. App. Div. 884, 186 N.E. 28 (1933); see
Blowring v. Bowers, 24 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1928 ), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 6o8 (1928).
"'Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 3o5 U.S. 19 (1938); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S.
37 (1920).
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foregoing principles, can be imposed by both the state of domicile
and the state wherein the income is earned.
2. Application of state income tax laws to servicemen and their de-
pendents living outside the state of domicile.
From a consideration of the general limits of state taxing authority,
it is appropriate to proceed to a consideration of the income tax laws
of particular states as they apply to the serviceman and his depen-
dents. Income from wages, business and intangible personal property
will be considered.
In analyzing the tax laws of ten states,' 8 it has been found that
each of these states exercises its full constitutional authority by impos-
ing an income tax upon the entire income of every resident and upon
the income of every nonresident which is derived from sources within
the state.19 Since a resident can be taxed upon his entire income wheth-
er earned from sources within or without a state, it is of vital im-
portance in the case of a serviceman and his dependents who have
income from sources in different states to know whether they are
considered to be residents or nonresidents for purposes of income tax.
The definition of the term resident varies somewhat from state to
state but, except in states such as Massachusetts, 20 where the term resi-
dent is equated to the term domicile, it ordinarily includes persons
who are domiciled in the state as well as persons who have lived within
the state for a substantial period of time on other than a transitory
basis. For example, the Virginia income tax statute provides that the
term resident means every person domiciled in -the state and every
other person who, for more than six months of the taxable year, main-
tains his place of abode within the state.21 Thus, a serviceman or a de-
pendent, who is not domiciled in Virginia, but who maintains a home
there for more than six months would appear to come within the
statutory definition.
2Alabama, California, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Massachusetts, New York,
North Carolina, Oklahoma and Virginia.
20Ala. Code tit. 51 § 375 (g4o); Cal. Rev. & Tax. § 17o41; Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 138-1-2 (1953); Ga. Code § 92-3101 (1933); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 79-3203
(1949); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 62 § 5 A (1958); N.Y. Tax Laws § 611, 631; N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 105-133 (1958); Okla, Stat. tit. 68 § 876 (1951); Va. Code Ann. § 57-101
(195o).
mAMass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 62 § 5A (1958).
2'Va. Code Ann. § 58-77 (95o).
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a. The serviceman.
(i) Milita y pay.
The states have, however, taken cognizance of Section 514 which
provides two grounds for exempting the serviceman's military pay
from the income tax of the state of temporary residence.2 2 First, it is
recognized that a serviceman, because of the operation of Section 514,
has neither a domicile nor a residence in such state and thus is not
taxable as a resident within the meaning of the state income tax
statutes; and second, his compensation from military service is con-
sidered not to be from sources within the state of temporary resi-
dence.23 Therefore, he, as a nonresident, cannot be taxed upon it
since a state does not have the authority to tax a nonresident on in-
come not derived from sources within the state.
24
A problem may arise with respect to the taxation of a serviceman's
military pay in the case of a serviceman who is domiciled in a com-
munity property state and stationed in another state. Under the com-
munity property laws of the state of the serviceman's domicile, the
salary of a spouse is generally considered to be community property
2-
in which the other spouse has a one half interest.2 6 On this basis, it
would appear that taxing authorities of the state wherein the service-
man and his wife are stationed, could, in accordance with the law
of the state of domicile,2 7 assert that one half of the serviceman's
military pay is income of the wife and to this extent is not exempt
from income tax under the provisions of section 514. If the wife is con-
sidered to be a resident for tax purposes, within the statutory defini-
tion of the state where she is residing, it would appear that such in-
come would be taxable since residents are taxable on all income
whether earned from sources within or without the state of residence.
"E.g., Ala. Dept. Rev. Reg. § 373.5, 1 CGH, State Tax Rep. Ala. § 11-599 (1957);
Cal. FTB Reg. §§ 17o3-17o15(h), i CCH Inc., State Tax Rep. Cal. § 15075 (196o);
Colo. Director Rev. Reg., Addenda Art. 1, i CCII Inc., State Tax Rep. Colo., §
10-222 ('959); Ga. Rev. Reg. § 92-3oo2(c), CCH Inc., State Tax Rep. Ga., § io-o6i
(1956); Mass. Tax Reg. § 4, CCI Inc., State Tax Rep. Mass. § 15-8o3B (1958); N.Y.
Tax Reg. § 632e, 1 CCH Inc., State Tax Rep. § 17-405 N.Y. (1957).
nSection 17, 56 Stat. 777 (1942), as amended, § i, 58 Stat. 722 (1944), 50 U.S.C.
App. 574 (1958)-
21Cases cited note 59, supra.
i de Funiak, Principles of Community Property 163 (1943).
21-Horton v. Horton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 36o, 252 P.2d 397 (1953); 1 de Funiak, Prin-
ciples of Community Property 302 (1943).
2tVining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 850, 58 So. 2d 34 (1952); Commonwealth v. Terjen,
197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 8oi (1956); 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property
252 (1943).
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If, however, the wife is considered to be a nonresident, it is arguable
that even though she has one half interest in her husband's military
pay, such pay, under the provisions of section 514 is not considered
to be from sources within that state,28 and is not, therefore, taxable.
An analysis of state tax statutes, however, leads to the conclusion
that, with the exception of states where the term residence is equated
to domicile, the definition of the term residence is broad enough to
encompass the wife of a serviceman. 29 Based upon the premise that
she is a resident, a strong argument can be made for the proposition
that she is taxable on all income regardless of its source, including one
half of her husband's military pay.
It may be that the various states have not attempted to tax one
half of the serviceman's military pay under this theory because of an
exsiting practice in community property states which permits a spouse
to transfer his or her interest in income or property to the other spouse
with the result that the property or income so transferred is the sep-
arate property of the recipient.30 Thus, the wife of a serviceman,
where they are domiciled in a community property state, could ap-
parently avoid such a tax by entering into an agreement with her hus-
band whereby the wife agrees that her interest in the husband's mili-
tary pay is transferred to the husband. After such a transfer, the in-
come, being entirely that of the serviceman, would be exempt under
section 514. It seems clear that such an agreement would be recog-
nized by the state wherein these persons are stationed since the es-
tablished conflicts of law rule provides that the nature and extent of
ownership in community property is determined in accordance with
the law of the community property state wherein the taxpayers are
domiciled.31 Although outside the scope of this paper, it is believed
important to observe that an agreement such as this, between a
serviceman and his wife, might well result in the avoidance of income
tax by the state of temporary residence, but at the same time create
other legal problems not contemplated in the agreement. 32
-Section 17, 56 Stat. 777 (1942), as amended, § 1, 58 Stat. 722 (1944), 50 U.S.C.
App. 574 (1958).
"E.g., Va. Code Ann. § 58-77 (1950).
OHelvering v. Hickman, 7o F.2d 985 (9 th Cir. 1934); Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Cleverdon, 16 Cal. 2d 788, io8 P.2d 405 (1941); Wren v. Wren,
oo Cal. 276, 34 Pac. 775 (1893); 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property 400
(1943).
Wining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 850, 58 So. 2d 34 (1952); Commonwealth v. Terjen,
197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.2d 8oi (1956); 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property.
252 (1943).
mSee Sidebottom v. Robinson, a16 F.2d 816 (gth Cir. 1954) regarding possible
effect of wife's rights in property purchased with such separate earnings upon
28 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXI
Because of the undesirable consequences which may flow from
such an agreement, it is important to determine whether a state has
the authority to tax under this community property theory in the ab-
sence of an agreement between husband and wife. It is believed that
the basic argument against such a theory of taxation is reflected in
the legislative history of section 514 which indicates that military pay
is a separate and unique classification of income, to be taxed only by
the state of domicile of the serviceman, even though the technical
basis for taxing such income may exist in another state.3 3 Dictum in
Dameron v. Brodhead indicates that the Supreme Court, in recogni-
tion of this Congressional intent, would probably strike down an at-
temp to tax military pay on this theory.
3 4
(2) Non-Military income.
In addition to his military pay, the serviceman frequently earns
non-military wages during his off-duty time. In considering his tax
liability on such income, it is to be remembered that by operation of
Section 514, the serviceman is not a resident for tax purposes in any
state except his state of domicile.35 When present in any other state,
he is, by operation of law, therefore, a nonresident for tax purposes.
But since section 514 provides no exemption from taxation on non-
military income, the serviceman, like any other nonresident, is liable
for income tax to the state of temporary residence upon all such wages
resulting from services performed within the state.36 Likewise, the
nonresident serviceman, like any other nonresident, is not taxable
by the state of temporary residence on income which is derived from
services performed outside that state.37 For example, it is clear that
a soldier, domiciled in Pennsylvania, living in Columbus, Georgia,
pursuant to military orders, and working after hours for a private
business in Phenix City, Alabama, would be liable for Alabama
death of husband; likewise, the amount of estate taxes upon husband's estate could
be affected by such an agreement, United States v. Goodyear, 99 F.2d 523 (gth Cir.
1938), a gift of property under such an agreement may result in the imposition of
a gift tax, Commonwealth v. Terjen, 197 Va. 596, go S.E. 2d 8o1 (1956); such an
agreement could also affect the division of property in the event of divorce, 1
de Funiak, Principles of Community Property 643-50 (1943).
nH.R. Rep. No. 1514, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. 1-2 (9-14); S. Rep. No. 959, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1944).
3'345 U.S. 322, 326 (1952).
5Statute cited note 23, supra.
3'Case cited note 14, supra.
' Cases cited note 15, supra.
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state income tax on the income from his off-duty job but would not
be liable to the State of Georgia. 3s
Since section 514 does not exempt business income of the service-
man from taxation, it is clear that income of this nature, which is de-
rived from the operation of a business within the state of temporary
residence, is taxable by that state whereas income which the nonresi-
dent serviceman derives from a business operated outside the state of
his temporary residence is not taxable by that state. 39 Thus, under
the same principles which apply to the serviceman's non-military
wages, income which the serviceman receives, for example, from the
operation of a motel in the state of temporary residence is taxable
by that state since it is derived from sources within the state. On the
other hand, if the nonresident serviceman derives income from a
motel which is located in a state other than the one in which he is
temporarily residing, he is not liable for income tax by the state of
temporary residence since this income is derived from sources outside
that state.
Another source of income for the serviceman is from intangible
personal property such as stocks, bonds and bank deposits. It is well
established in most jurisdictions that the situs of such intangibles fol-
lows the domicile of the owner except where they constitute the stock in
trade, or are used in connection with a business.4 0 Under this exception,
the intangible personal property acquires a business situs in the state
where the commercial enterprise exists and is taxable by that state.
Thus, in the case of a non-domiciliary serviceman, it appears
clear under the foregoing rule that income which is derived from his
stocks, bonds and other intangibles, unless they are used in or become
a part of a commercial enterprise, is not subject to income tax by
the state of temporary residence. Since the tax basis-domicile-results
in his exemption from such tax by the state of temporary residence,
the serviceman need not invoke the exemption provisions of section
514 as they pertain to intangibles.
If, however, intangibles of the non-domiciliary serviceman become
part of the stock in trade of a commercial enterprise within the state
of temporary residence, it is clear that they would be considered to
have a business situs within that state. Therefore, the income from
-,Ala. Code tit. 51 § 373 (1940); Ga. Code § 92-3101 (1933).
'E.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax §§ 17041, 17071; N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-133, 105-141
(1958).
"'Suttles v. Illionis Glass Co., 2o6 Ga. 849, 59 S.E.2d 392 (1950); Hunt v. Eddy,
15o Kan. 1, 90 P.2d 1 (1939); Goldman v. Tax Commissioner, 230 Mass. 554, 120
N.E. 74 (1918).
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them would be taxable by the state of temporary residence wherein
the business situs is found to exist. Although there are no reported
cases on this particular point, a literal reading of section 514 indicates
that nothing in that section will prevent the state of temporary resi-
dence from taxing the personal property of a serviceman which is
used in a trade or business in that state.
41
b. The Serviceman's Dependents.
From a consideration of the serviceman's income tax liability in the
state of temporary residence, it is appropriate to consider next the
corresponding tax liabilities of his dependents who accompany him
as he moves from state to state pursuant to military orders.
The wages of a serviceman's non-domiciliary wife or child, which
are derived from services performed within the state where they are
residing, as well as income from a business which they operate within
the state, are clearly taxable therein. This is true since, in each case,
the income is derived from sources within the state.42 If the non-
domiciliary dependent earns wages from services performed or re-
ceives income from a business operated outside this state, income tax
liability depends upon the residency status of the dependent. If con-
sidered to be a resident, the dependent is taxable on this income since
residents are taxable on all income from within or without the taxing
state; 43 but if considered a nonresident, the dependent is not taxable
on this income, which in each instance, is derived from sources with-
out the state. Residency status is, therefore, of vital importance to a
non-domiciliary dependent who has income from outside the state
where he is residing.
An analysis of state tax statutes and regulations of ten states 44 shows
that the residency status of dependents for income tax purposes is not
clear. In Colorado, for example, a resident is one who is domiciled in
Colorado or one who maintains a permanent place of abode within the
state and spends in the aggregate more than six months of the taxable
year within the state. 45 Permanent place of abode has been held to
mean the maintenance of a home or apartment in Colorado.46 A non-
"Statute cited note 23, supra.
-'Case cited note 14, supra.
13Cases cited note 13, supra.




resident is any person who is not a resident, as defined above, or who
is qualified as a nonresident under a special statutory provision. The
special statute provides that bona fide residents of states other than
Colorado, who desire to establish a temporary residence in Colorado,
may make application to the Director of Revenue for a Certificate of
Non-Residence.47 The Director may refuse to issue this certificate or
revoke it after issuance if he determines that the residence of the in-
dividual involved is in fact not temporary. Although Colorado, as in
the case of the other states considered, has not promulgated general
regulations regarding the residency status of dependents, it would ap-
pear that the doubt can be expeditiously resolved in Colorado by
having the dependent apply to the Director of Revenue for a Certifi-
cate of Non-Residence. The Director could then make an administra-
tive determination, as required by statute, whether such person is a
resident or nonresident for income tax purposes. It would seem that
Colorado has devised a method for quickly resolving this knotty ques-
tion of residence which might well be adopted by other states.
As previously indicated in discussing the serviceman's income tax
liability in the state of temporary residence, the situs of intangibles for
tax purposes is, in most jurisdictions, at the domicile of the owner.48
In states following this rule, it seems clear that the non-domiciliary
dependent, like the non-domiciliary serviceman, is not taxable on in-
come from intangibles, other than those which have acquired a busi-
ness situs in the state where the dependent is living. In Colorado,
however, pertinent tax regulations seem to indicate that the situs
of intangibles follows the residence of the owner rather than his
domicile.49 If, therefore, a non-domiciliary dependent is considered
to be a resident of Colorado, all income from intangibles owned by the
dependent, such as stock dividends and interest from bonds, would
apparently be subject to Colorado income tax. The introduction of
what is apparently a new tax basis for taxing the income from in-
tangibles underscores once again the importance of determining
residency status in order to correctly ascertain tax liability.50
'TColo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 138-1-52, 138-1-55, 138-1-56, 138-1-57 (1953).
19Cases cited note 40, supra.
'"Colo. Director Rev. Reg, Art. 4a, 1 CCH Inc., State Tax Rep. Colo. § 10-504
(1959); see Colo. Director Rev. Reg. Addenda Art. 1, 1 CCH Inc., State Tax Rep.
Colo. § 10-222 (1959).
10fnis apparent difference in the Colorado tax basis does not alter the serv-
iceman's exemption in that state since § 514 provides that his personal property,
including intangibles, when not used in a trade or business, does not acquire a
situs for purposes of taxation in the state where he is serving solely because
of military orders, § 17, 56 Stat. 777 (1942), as amended, § 1, 58 Stat. 722 (1944),
50 U-S.C. App. 574 (1958).
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One further point merits consideration with respect to the im-
position of state income tax on non-domiciliary dependents. In the
event a dependent is employed by the Federal Government within a
particular state, that state is empowered to tax the income which the
dependent receives from the Federal Government on the basis that
such income is derived from sources within the state. The authority
of the states to impose a tax on such income was first recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe.51
This authority to tax was subsequently codified in the Public Salary
Act of 1939.52 Under the Buck Act, the United States has also ceded
to the states jurisdiction to tax the income of persons, including de-
pendents, residing within or receiving income from transactions or
services performed in federal areas, such as military reservations.
53
3. Application of state income tax laws to servicemen and their de-
pendents in the state of domicile.
Thus far, this study has involved the income tax liability of the
serviceman and his dependents in states other than the state of domi-
cile.
The state of domicile has the power to tax its domiciliaries on all
income whether earned within or without the state.54 Consequently,
it is clear in the case of a dependent that income from any of the vari-
ous sources previously discussed, such as income from wages, business
or intangibles, is taxable by the state of domicile. A similar result is
reached in the case of a serviceman, since under section 514, he re-
tains a taxable status for income tax purposes in the state of domicile,
including taxation of his military pay.z5
It is readily apparent, therefore, that with the exception of the mili-
tary pay of the serviceman and income from intangibles, in most
states, the serviceman and his dependents can conceivably be taxed
upon their income by both the state of domicile and the state wherein
the income is earned. Although multiple taxation is not unconstitu-
tional,56 the states have attempted to minimize this burden through
a system of tax credits and reciprocal agreements. 57 An examination of
113o6 U.S. 466 (1939).
-Public Salary Act, 53 Stat. 575 (1939), 5 U.S.C. § 84a (1958).
nBuck Act, 61 Stat. 641 (194o), 4 U.S.C. § 1o6 (1958).
&Cases cited note 13, supra.
5H.R. Rep. No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1944); S. Rep. No. 959, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1944).
rOCases cited at note 17, supra.




these agreements, however, reveals a lack of uniformity and the con-
tinuation of multiple taxation.53
4. Proposed legislation.
It would appear that the burden of multiple taxation upon the
serviceman, his dependents and other persons having a similar status,
could be alleviated if state legislatures would uniformly adopt leg-
islation similar to the New York statute. The New York statute pro-
vides that a domiciliary of New York will not be taxed as a resident
if he maintains no permanent place of abode in the State of New York;
maintains a permanent place of abode outside the State of New
York; and spends not more than thirty days of the taxable year within
the state.5 9 Although the meaning of the term "permanent place of
abode," as used in the statute, is not entirely clear, it is believed that
a reasonable interpretation has been placed upon it. In the case of
Ryan v. Chapman,60 the court was confronted with the residency status
of a husband and wife who gave up their home in New York upon
the husband's entering military service. Thereafter, they resided in
California in a leased home until the husband's discharge from the
Army and spent no time in New York while the husband was in the
service. The court held that under these circumstances both husband
and wife were maintaining a permanent place of abode outside the
state and were not residents of the State of New York for income tax
purposes during the period of absence. In order to avoid any misunder-
standing, however, it is believed that the provision in the New York
statute, which requires proof that the domiciliary maintain a per-
manent place of abode outside the state, should be changed for pur-
poses of the proposed uniform statute to require only that the domi-
ciliary reside outside the state of domicile during the tax year. It is
believed that this language would minimize problems of statutory
interpretation which are inherent in the phrase, "permanent place
of abode."
Such a statute, if adopted by all the states, would relieve the ser-
E.g., see CGH Inc., State Tax Rep. Va. § 10-852.10 (1959).
rN.Y. Tax Laws § 6o5(a), "Resident individual. A resident individual means an
individual (s) who is domiciled in the state, unless he maintains no permanent place
of abode in this state, maintains a permanent place of abode elsewhere, and spends
in the aggregate not more than thirty days of the taxable year in this state..."
076 N.Y.S. 2d 341, 273 App. Div. 99 (1948); Statement of Policy, Income Tax
Bureau, Part I November 3o, 1959, 1 CCH Inc., State Tax Rep. § 15-075.12 N.Y.
(1957).
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viceman and his dependents from taxation by the state of domicile
during periods of time when they are absent from the state. This type
of statute is considered fair from the standpoint of the state of domi-
cile since the long recognized basis for taxation by a government is
the relation of the tax on a particular taxpayer to the opportunities,
benefits, or protection which the taxing state can give to this tax-
payer.61 Obviously, the serviceman and his dependents who are absent
from the state of domicile do not receive benefits of this nature. It
is recognized that such a uniform law, when considered together
with section 514, would completely immunize many servicemen from
all state income taxes. This situation could be remedied, however, by
amending section 514 to permit the state of temporary residence to
,tax the military pay of the serviceman who is receiving the benefits
of government from that state. Under this proposal, the serviceman and
his dependents would not be liable for state income tax while over-
seas.
It is believed that enactment of the proposed uniform statute
would provide a more equitable basis for taxing the serviceman and
his dependents, and would, upon the amendment of section 514, lead
to a more equitable distribution of tax revenue among those states
having large military bases within their borders. As previously indi-
cated, taxation by the state of temporary residence could result in
multiple taxation in the case of servicemen who are moved from one
state of temporary residence to another within the same tax year. In
order to prevent such a situation, the proposed uniform law should
provide for prorating taxes between the taxing states. Such a provis-
ion would be similar to reciprocal agreements which presently exist
between some states. In addition, it is believed that such a uniform
statute would also benefit other persons whose professions require
their absence from the state of domicile for extended periods of time.
B. Tangible Personal Property Tax.
1. Authority of the states to tax tangible personal property.
The prevailing rule is that the actual situs of tangible personal
property and not the domicile of the owner forms the legal basis for
state taxation of such property.62 In the Union Refrigerator Company
case, the United States Supreme Court laid down the rule that an at-
tempt by the state of domicile of the owner to levy a personal prop-
OStandard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1951).
-'51 Am. Jur. Taxation § 452 (1944).
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erty tax upon tangible personal property located wholly within an-
other state is beyond the power of the legislature as a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law.63 Since this decision, the Supreme
Court has applied the rule that jurisdiction to tax is founded on the
actual presence of the tangible personal property within the taxing
state.64 These decisions have not been based upon a constitutional
prohibition against double taxation, but on the basis that the facts
necessary to give the property a situs for taxation in one state neces-
sarily negate the requirements of a situs for taxation in another state.
The cases have also indicated, by inference, however, that immunity
from taxation by the state of domicile rests upon the principle that
property must be permanently located outside the state of domicile or
be in another jurisdiction under such circumstances as to give it a local
situs there for purposes of taxation. 65 Immunity from taxation by
the state of domicile apparently does not apply, therefore, to property
not permanently located in another state but which is in one place
today and another place tomorrow.
If the situs of privately owned personal property is in an area
where the Federal Government has exclusive jurisdiction, it seems well
settled that such property is immune from state taxation. The lead-
ing case on this point is Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook,66 wherein the
Supreme Court held that the State of Arkansas was without authority
to tax privately owned personal property located on a military reser-
vation over which the Federal Government had exclusive jurisdiction.
Since Congress has not chosen to pass legislation granting the states
authority to tax private personal property in such areas, as it did with
respect to state income tax,67 it is apparent that private personal prop-
erty which is located in such areas is immune from state taxation.
2. Application of state tangible personal property tax laws to service-
men and their dependents outside the state of domicile.
Having outlined the general limits of the state taxing authority
as it pertains to tangible personal property, attention will next be
given to the application of specific state laws to the tangible personal
3Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
1-Lawrence v. State Tax Commissioner, 286 U.S. 276 (1932), Blodgett v. Siber-
nan, 277 U.S. (1928).
6Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (195); Northwest Airlines v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell,
290 U.S. 158 (1933); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
612-81 U.S. 647 (1930).
"Statute cited note 53 supra.
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property of the serviceman and his dependents. State taxation of
household effects, motor vehicles, house trailers and personal property
of the serviceman and his dependents used in business will be con-
sidered in this section.
An analysis of the tax laws of the various states considered in this
study indicates no conflict with the general rule that tangible personal
property is taxable by the state where it is located.68 In the absence
of federal legislation, therefore, the tangible personal property of a
serviceman and his dependents would apparently acquire a taxable
situs in any state where it is physically located.
a. The Serviceman.
With respect to the serviceman's tax liability, paragraph one, Sec-
tion 514, provides that his personal property, other than that which is
used in a trade or business, does not acquire a taxable situs in a state
where he is present solely because of military orders.69 In view of
,the interpretation placed upon this provision of section 514 in Darner-
on v. Brodhead,70 it is clear that the state of temporary residence does
not have 'the authority to impose a personal property tax upon house-
hold effects, motor vehicles, house trailers, and other non-commercial
personal property which is owned by a non-domiciliary serviceman who
is living in a state solely because of military orders.
In the Dameron case, the taxing authorities of the City of Denver,
in assessing a personal property tax against a nonresident Air Force
officer who was in Colorado solely because of military orders, argued
that section 514 was enacted in order to prohibit multiple taxation;
and since this officer had not paid personal property tax on his house-
hold effects to his state of domicile, he was taxable in Colorado. The
Supreme Court, in striking down this tax, held that section 514 saved
the sole right of taxation to the state of domicile whether or not that
state exercised the right; and therefore the exemption under paragraph
one of section 514 is not conditioned upon the collection of a tax by
the state of domicile.71 Although this case clearly indicates that tan-
gible personal property of the serviceman, who is in a state solely be-
cause of military orders, is exempt from personal property tax, prob-
18E.g., Ala. Code tit. 51 § 21 (1940); Cal. Rev. & Tax. § 2o; N.C. Gen. Stat. §
1o5-281 (1958); Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 15 (1951); Va. Code Ann. § 58-834 (1950).
"§ 17, 56 Stat. 777 (1942), as amended, § 1, 58 Stat. 722 (1944), 50 U.S.C. App.
574 (1958).
'345 U.S. 322 (1953).
1'Id. at 326.
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lems arise when states attempt to impose a different type of tax upon
automobiles and trailers.
For example, some states impose a tax on motor vehicles for the
privilege of using the highways. These taxes are considered to be
excise and not personal property taxes.72 From this premise, it is then
argued that since paragraph one of section 514 only exempts the ser-
viceman from personal property taxes, he is not exempt from excise
taxes unless paragraph two of section 514 applies.73 Paragraph two
of section 514 provides that a serviceman shall not be exempt from fees,
excises or licenses on motor vehicles by the state of temporary residence
unless such taxes have been paid by the serviceman in his state of
domicile.7 4 In those cases, therefore, where the serviceman has not
paid the required taxes in his state of domicile, these excise taxes
have been assessed.
75
In the only reported case which sheds any light on this question,
Woodroffe v. Village of Park Forest,76 decided prior to Dameron v.
Brodhead, the court held that an Army officer, domiciled in Penn-
sylvania, and stationed in Illinois, was exempt from payment of a
vehicle tax imposed by the Village of Park Forest, Illinois. Unfortu-
nately, this case is not clear as to whether the tax was considered to be
one on property and thus exempt under paragraph one of section 514
or whether it was considered to be a license, fee, or excise and thus
exempt under paragraph two of section 514. The court did state as
one ground for its decision, however, that since the officer had bought
a Pennsylvania license, the only tax required by his state of domicile,
he was exempt from the Illinois tax. Thus, by implication, this case
lends support to the proposition that an exemption from an excise
tax or fee on an automobile, as distinguished from a general Property
tax, is justified only where the serviceman has paid such fees and
excises as his state of domicile may require.
"-City of Los Angeles v. Riley, 6 Cal. 2d 621, 59 P.2d 137 (1936); Kelly v. City
of San Diego, 63 Cal. App. 2d 638, 147 P.2d 127 (1944); Cal. Rev. & Tax § io751;
Colo. Rev. Stat Ann. § 138-5-3(2) (1953); Ops. Att'y Gen. Colo., Nov. 23, 1959,
2 CCH, New Matter, State Tax Rep. Colo. § 200-070 (1959); Mass, Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 6oA § 1 (1958); In the Matter of Baptist General Convention, 195 Okla. 258,
,r,6 P.2d ioi8 (1945).
nOps. Att'y Gen. Colo., Nov. 23, 1959, 2 CCH, New Matter, State Tax Rep.
Colo. § 200-070 (1959).
7'Section 17, 56 Stat. 777 (1942), as amended, § 1, 58 Stat. 722 (1944), 50 U.S.C.
App. 574 (1958).
'7Ops. Att'y Gen. Colo. Nov. 23, 1959, 2 CCH, New Matter, State Tax Rep.
Colo. § 2oo-07o (1959). Compare Morrill v. Hamel, 337 Mass. 83, 148 N.E.2d 283
(1958).
:"17 F. Supp. 9o6 (N.D. Ill. 1952).
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An opinion of the Attorney General of Colorado reflects a similar
problem in connection with the taxation of housetrailers. In Colorado,
motor vehicles are considered to be a separate class of personal prop-
erty and are subject to a "specific ownership" tax.77 This tax is con-
sidered to be an excise tax which is assessed for the privilege of using
motor vehicles on the highways of the state. In 1959, the Attorney
General of Colorado ruled that the mobile home of a nonresident ser-
viceman, being a motor vehicle within the statutory definition of that
term, was subject to the specific ownership tax.78 This ruling was based
on the fact that the serviceman had not licensed his car or paid other
required fees to his state of domicile and was not, therefore, exempt
from this excise tax under paragraph two of section 514.7 9
Although this study does not include excise taxes, the foregoing
discussion illustrates the necessity of distinguishing between the tax
bases for excise and general property taxes in order to apply section
514 properly.
The laws of several of the states considered in this study have
separate provisions for the taxation of tangible personal property
which is used in connection with a trade or business,8 0 whereas other
state laws make no distinction between tangibles used in business and
other tangibles insofar as taxing them is concerned.81 In this connec-
tion, section 514 narrows the personal property exemption of the
serviceman with respect to such property. It provides that personal
property of the serviceman which is used in a trade or business within
a state where he is temporarily residing does not lose its situs for pur-
poses of taxation and is, therefore, taxable by such state.82 Although
there are no reported cases interpreting this provision of section 514,
a literal reading of it indicates a congressional intent to leave the
serviceman in exactly the same position, for tax purposes, as any
'Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 138-5-3(2) (1953).
71Ops. Att'y Gen. Colo., Nov. 23, 1959, 2 CCH, New Matter, State Tax Rep.
Colo. § 200-070 (1959).
7The Attorney General of Colorado 'has retreated from this position in those
cases where the mobile homes are not being moved on the highways of Colorado
but are being used as residences, Colorado Springs Free Press, January 17, 1961. The
Attorney General's new position is consistent with a prior opinion from his office
wherein the view was expressed that such an excise tax can be assessed only when
the motor vehicle is being used on the highways, Ops. Att'y Gen. Colo., March 1,
1956, Report of Att'y Gen. Colo., 1955-56.
8DE.g., Ala. Code tit. 51 § 21 (1940).
8'E.g., Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 79-101 (1949).
"Statute cited note 69, supra.
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other person who has acquired personal property for business pur-
poses.
8 3
A potential problem, very similar to one discussed in connection
with income tax, concerns the possible taxation of personal property
of a serviceman domiciled in a community property state. Under state
community property laws, property which is purchased with com-
munity funds is considered to be community property8 4 in which each
spouse is considered to have one half interest.8 5 It would appear,
therefore, that even if the evidence of title in personal property indi-
cates that the serviceman-husband is the sole owner of the property-
title to an automobile, for example-the state of temporary residence
could look behind such a title to see if the property was purchased
with community funds.8 6 If so purchased, the state of temporary resi-
dence, in applying the property law of the domicile, s 7 could assess a
personal property tax on one half the value of such property on the
theory that it is owned by the wife. This being so, her interest would
clearly fall outside the protection of section 514.88
As was indicated in the discussion of income tax, it may be that
the various states have not attempted to tax on this theory because
of a practice which exists in community property states whereby a
spouse is permitted to transfer his or her interest in community prop-
erty to the other spouse. Once this is done, the property so transferred
becomes the separate property of the recipient.8 9 Thus, the wife of a
serviceman, in a situation where they are domiciled in a community
property state, could apparently avoid such a tax by entering into an
agreement with the serviceman-husband, whereby the wife agrees that
her interest in the husband's property, e.g., the automobile, house-
trailer, or household effects, is transferred to the husband. After such
'sSee Ops. Att'y Gen. N.C., Feb. 12, 1951, 1 CCH Prop., State Tax Rep. §
20-202 09 (1959).
"Woods v. Naimy, 69 F.2d 892 (gth Cir 1934); 11 Am. Jur. Community Prop-
erty § 25 (1937).
IHorton v. Horton, 115 Cal. App. 2d 36o, 252 P.2d 397 (1953); 1 de Funiak, Prin-
ciples of Community Property 302 (1943).
Wni Am. Jur. Community Property § 25 (1937).
6Wining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 850, 58 So. 2d 34 (1952); Commonwealth v. Ter-
jen, 197 Va. 596, 9o S.E.2d 8oi (1956); 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Prop-
erty 252 (1943).
SSSee text after note 32 and notes 33, 34, supra, for a discussion of whether this
theory of taxation would violate section 514.
0Helvering v. H-ickman, 7o F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1934); Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Cleverdon, 16 Cal. 2d 788, 1o8 P.2d 405 (1941); Wren v. Wren, loo Cal.
276, 34 Pac. 775 (1893); 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community Property 400 (1943).
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a transfer of ownership, the personal property, being completely that
of the serviceman-husband, is exempt from taxation by operation
of section 514. Seemingly, the state wherein the serviceman and his
dependents are stationed will recognize such an agreement, since the
established conflicts of law rule provides that the nature and extent
of ownership in community property is determined in accordance with
the law of the community property state in which the taxpayers are
domiciled.90
b. The Serviceman's Dependents.
Although there are very few cases involving the taxation of house-
hold effects, motor vehicles, housetrailers and other items of tangible
personal property owned by dependents, those authorities which do
exist clearly indicate that dependents are taxable on tangible personal
property which is located within the state of temporary residence.9 1
Although there are no reported cases, it would appear that under
some state statutes tangible personal property which is owned jointly
by the serviceman and his dependent could be assessed to the extent
of the dependent's interest in the property.92 Further, the nonpayment
of such taxes by the dependent could under some state statutes result
in the establishment of a lien against any of the dependent's personal
property located in the state.
93
In those cases where tangible personal property of a dependent is
located on a military reservation, the state's authority to tax this
property depends upon the type of jurisdiction which the Federal
Government exercises over the reservation. Under the ruling in the
Surplus Trading Company case,94 the states have no authority to tax
personal property in areas under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States. Consistent with the holding in this case, various states
exercise the authority to tax privately owned tangible personal prop-
erty in areas where federal jurisdiction is less than exclusive and in
I°Vining v. Smith, 213 Miss. 85o, 58 So. 2d 34 (1952); Commonwealth v. Ter-
jen, 197 Va. 596, 9° S.E.2d 8oi (1956); 1 de Funiak, Principles of Community
Property 252 (1943). See text at note 32 supra, regarding other legal consequences
which may result from such agreements.
9Ops. Att'y Gen. N.C., March 14, 196o, 2 COH New Matter, State Tax Rep.
§ 2oo-665 (1959); see 32 Ops. Att'y Gen. N.C. 404 (1953).
"-See 51 Am. Jur. Taxation §§ 419, 1011 (1939).
"E.g., Ryder v. Livingston, 145 Neb. 862, 18 N.W.2d 507 (1945).
"Case cited note 66, supra.
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those areas over which the states reserved the authority to tax at the
time the land was ceded to the Federal Government.95
3. Application of state tangible personal property tax laws to service-
men and their dependents in the state of domicile.
From a consideration of the tax liability of the serviceman and his
dependents in the state of temporary residence, it is appropriate to pro-
ceed to a consideration of their tax liability in the state of domicile.
Since section 514 does not prohibit the state of domicile from tax-
ing a serviceman,906 it is clear that a serviceman, stationed and living
in his state of domicile, is subject to a tax on his tangible personal
property located in the state.97
Since dependents have no exemption of any kind unde section
514 or any other federal statute, it is clear that their liability for tax
upon tangible personal property located in the state of domicile is
the same as that of the serviceman.
Where, however, the tangible personal property of the serviceman
is physically located in another state where he is stationed, and is
not taxable in that state because of an exemption under section 514,
there is some uncertainty whether such property is taxable by the
state of domicile. The primary question to be answered is whether the
state of domicile has the constitutional authority to impose a tax upon
tangible personal property of a serviceman which is located wholly
outside its borders. There is no decided case precisely on this point.
It is necessary, therefore, to look to pronouncements of the Supreme
Court in closely related cases in an attempt to find an answer.
As indicated above, the Supreme Court, in the Union Refrigerator
Company case, laid down the rule that an attempt by the state of
domicile of the owner to levy a personal property tax on tangible
personal property located wholly within another state is beyond
the power of the legislature as a taking of property without due process
of law.98 However, this case also indicates by way of dictum that im-
munity from taxation by the state of domicile does not apply to prop-
erty not permanently located in another state.
"Aa. Code tit. 51 § 19; 53 Ops. Att'y Gen. Ala. 59 (1948); 25 Ops. Att'y Gen.
Ala. 124 (1941); Ops. Att'y Gen. N.C., Feb. 12, 1951, 1 CCH Prop., State Tax Rep.
§ 20-202.o9 N.C. (1959).
96Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
rBut see Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (193o) regarding private
personal property located in a federal area over which the Federal Government has
exclusive jurisdiction.
"8Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (19o5).
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Turning to the serviceman's situation, it is found that section 514
provides that tangible personal property of the serviceman shall not
have a "situs for taxation" in the state where he is living solely be-
cause of military orders. Thus, the better view appears to be that
since by operation of section 514, his tangible personal property has
no taxable situs in any other state, the state of domicile, under the
qualification set forth in the Union Refrigerator case, has the con-
stitutional authority to tax the tangible personal property of the
serviceman, which although physically located in another state, has
no taxable situs in the other state. Later cases indicate that normally
it is only personal property with a taxable situs in another state which
is exempt from levy by the domiciliary state.99 Finally, there is strong
support for this position in dictum of the Supreme Court in Dameron
v. Brodhead. There the Court, in construing the effect of section 514
upon the authority of the non-domiciliary state to tax tangible per-
sonal property of the serviceman, noted that section 514 saved the
sole right of taxation to the state of original residence. 100
Assuming, therefore, that the state of domicile has the constitu-
tional authority to impose a tax upon tangible personal property of the
serviceman physically located outside the state, it is also necessary to
ascertain whether the particular state statute is broad enough to per-
mit such a tax. In analyzing the tax laws of ten states, it was found
that under some state statutes the tangible personal property of the
serviceman must be physically present in the state of domicile on tax
day or it cannot be taxed.101 Other state statutes, however, have been
interpreted to include the tangible personal property of the service-
man, regardless of its physical location on tax day.
102
Since there is no provision of federal law which affects the situs
of the dependent's personal property, it seems clear, under the laws
of the states considered, that the actual location of the dependent's
personal property is its situs for tax purposes. 103 If, therefore, the
'Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1951); Northwest Airlines v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292 ('944); Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. Oklahoma ex Tel. Mitchell,
290 U.S. x58 (1933).
mDameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 326 (1953). It is believed that the court,
in using the words "original residence," was dearly referring to domicile.
'O"Departmental Opinion, Property Valuation Department Assessment Manual,
62, 66, Kansas, CHH Prop. State Tax Rep. § 29-701.236, Kan. (1958).
10Letter of Advice, Att'y Gen. Ga., October 23, 1959, CCH New Matter, State
Tax Rep. § 2oo-212, Ga. (1956); Letter of Advice, Att'y Gen. Ga., July 3, 1958,
CCH New Matter, State Tax Rep. § 200-142, Ga. (1956); 34 Ops. Att'y Gen. N.C. 161
('957)-
'-Ala. Code tit. 51 § 21 (1940); Cal. Rev. 9: Tax. § 2o; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-.281
(1958); Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 15 (1951); Va. Code Ann. § 58-834 (195o).
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tangible personal property of a dependent is located in a state other
than the state of domicile, it appears clear that the state of domicile
has no authority to tax and that the property is taxable by the state
where it is located.104 This is in contrast to the situation of the service-
man whose personal property, by operation of section 514, has no tax-
able situs anywhere outside the state of domicile.
Under these circumstances, it is apparent that a dependent, in
moving from state to state, could be taxed on his personal property
by more than one state during the same year.
4. Proposed legislation.
In order to lessen the burden of multiple taxation, it is believed
that uniform legislation should be enacted by the states to insure
either the taxation of tangible personal property by only one state
during a given year or a statute whereby the tax would be prorated
among the taxing states. It is believed that such legislation would not
only benefit the serviceman but also other transients having a similar
problem.
If all states would adopt such a uniform statute, it is believed
that a logical basis would then exist for removing the statutory ex-
emption which the serviceman has under section 514. With the re-
moval of this exemption, the serviceman, under the proposed uniform
statute, would pay taxes on his tangible personal property in the
state where his property is physically located. This, it is believed, is
a logical solution since every citizen should pay taxes in the state
where he is receiving the benefits of government.
C. Intangible Personal Property Tax.
i. Authority of the states to tax intangible personal property.
In analyzing the power of the states to impose income tax, one of
the types of income considered was that which is derived from intan-
gible personal property. Here, consideration is being given to a
property tax on intangibles.
As previously stated, intangibles are considered to have a taxable
situs at the domicile of the owner.105 unless such property has ac-
quired a business situs in another state. 106 It is recognized, however,
10'Case cited note 98, supra.
n 5Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
"'Id. at 366-67.
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that intangibles can be taxed by both the state of domicile and
the state where the property has acquired a business situs.107
2. Application of state tax laws to intangible personal property of
servicemen and their dependents stationed outside the state of
domicile.
The laws of seven of the ten states analyzed impose a property tax
upon intangible personal property. Each of these states follows the
general rule that the situs of such property, for purposes of taxation,
is in the state of the owner's domicile. 0 8 All these states also follow
the well recognized exception to the general rule which provides that
any intangible used in connection with a business enterprise acquires
a business situs in the state where the commercial enterprise is lo-
cated and is taxable in that state regardless of the domicile of the
owner. 09 Some states have, by statute, however, relinquished their
right to tax on the basis of domicile where the intangible has acquired
a business situs elsewhere." 0
It is clear, therefore, that the non-domiciliary serviceman and his
dependents are exempt from intangible personal property tax to the
same extent as any other person who is not domiciled in the state
where he is residing. Because this principle is apparently so well es-
tablished, no cases have been found where states have attempted to
impose a tax upon the intangibles of a non-domiciliary serviceman
or his dependents. Under these circumstances, there is no reason for
the serviceman to invoke the exemption provision of section 514 as it
pertains to intangibles.
If, however, the serviceman or his dependents establish a busi-
ness in the state of temporary residence, the intangibles which grow
out of or are part of this business acquire a business situs in and
are taxable by that state."' Section 514 does not provide an exemp-
tion.11 2
1°'Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
'E.g., Estate of Fair, 128 Cal. 6o7, 61 Pac. 184 (1900); Virginia Trust Co. of
Norfolk v. Virginia, 151 Va. 883, 141 S.E. 825 (1928).
uO-B.g., State v. Kidd, 125 Ala. 413, 28 So. 480 (19oo); Glen v. Buck, 272 P.2d 573
(1954).
"°E.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 68 § 15o4 (1951).
"'Case cited note 1o5, supra.
u'256 Stat. 777 (1942), as amended, 58 Stat. 722 ('944), 50 U.S.C. App. 574 (1958).
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3. Application of state tax laws to intangible personal property of
servicemen and their dependents in the state of domicile.
Since section 514 does not prohibit the state of domicile from tax-
ing the intangibles of the serviceman, it seems clear that both the
serviceman and his dependents are taxable by the state of domicile
on such property.113 This is true regardless of the taxpayer's location
or the location of evidence of the intangible, such as stock certifi-
cates or commercial paper.
1" 4
4. Future taxation of intangibles.
Except for the limited category of intangibles which acquire a
business situs, it is clear that intangibles are not subject to multiple
taxation.
As the search for additional revenue is intensified, however, it
may be that the states will depart from domicile, the traditional basis
for taxing intangibles, and adopt a broader basis"15 for determining
taxable situs, such as residence of the owner."16
If residence is ultimately adopted as a new tax basis for intangibles,
problems of multiple taxation similar to those which exist in the fields





In considering income tax upon the earnings of the serviceman
and his dependents, the question arises as to whether the bases under-
lying the imposition of these taxes are equitable to either the taxing
states or the individuals involved. It is believed not. It is believed that
domicile, as a basis for imposing income tax on servicemen and their
dependents, is antiquated. Thousands of these persons are part of a per-
n3See 27 Ops. Att'y Gen. N.C. 162 (1943).
"'Curry v. McCanless, 3o7 U.S. 357 (1939); 51 Am. Jur. Taxation §§ 463, 465
(1939).
mSee Colo. Director Rev. Reg. Art. 4a, i CCH Inc., State Tax Rep. Colo. §
10-504 0959); see Colo. Director Rev. Reg. Addenda Art. i, i CCH Inc., State Tax
Rep. Colo. § 10-222 (1959).
nCIt is believed that residence of the owner, as a tax basis for intangibles, is
constitutional. See the test of the United States Supreme Court, Scripto v. Carson,
362 US. 207, 210-11 (196o); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
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manent transient force and have no appreciable contact with the state
of domicile for long periods of time. During such periods of time they
neither live in the state of domicile nor receive governmental bene-
fits from that state. Under these circumstances, it is inequitable for
the state of domicile to be receiving revenue based on their income.
On the other hand, it is believed that the state where the serviceman
and his dependents are residing and receiving the benefits of govern-
ment should have the authority to tax all their income, including
military pay.117 Further, it is believed that servicemen and their de-
pendents should not be subject to income tax by both the state of
domicile and the state wherein they are residing.
In order ,to rectify this inequity to the state of temporary residence
and also alleviate the problem of multiple taxation for the service-
man and his dependents, it is proposed that a uniform statute be
enacted by the states. Under this statute, the state of domicile would
relinquish its authority to tax a domiciliary in those situations where
the domiciliary maintains no permanent place of abode in the state
and spends less than thirty days in the state during the tax year. Upon
the enactment of such a uniform statute, it is proposed that Congress
amend section 514 to permit taxation of the serviceman's military
pay by the state wherein he is residing pursuant to military orders.
In view of the current posture of the law, one further recommen-
dation is deemed appropriate. It is related to the residence status of
dependents. This study has shown that the residence of dependents
for income tax purposes is often difficult to ascertain under existing
state statutory definitions. In order to eliminate this uncertainty,
it is proposed that the states adopt a system similar to that which
exists in Colorado. There, a person moving into the state can apply
to the Director of Revenue for a Certificate of Nonresidence. The
Director can then administratively determine whether the applicant
is a resident or nonresident for purposes of taxation. It is believed
that a system such as this would result in a prompt clarification of
residence status and also reduce the incidence of litigation and tax
penalties growing out of lack of knowledge.
B. Tangible Personal Property Tax.
Under existing provisions of law, the serviceman's tangible per-
sonal property, except that which is used in a trade or business, is
"Tor a provocative argument against exemption of the serviceman from state
taxation, see Washington Evening Star, March 4, ig6i, § A, p. 4, col. 6, Letter to
the Editor.
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not taxable by the state of temporary residence. The tangible personal
property of his dependents is, however, taxable in any state where it is
physically located. Dependents, in moving from state to state, can be
taxed upon their tangible personal property by more than one state
during a single year. Thus, there exists the problem of multiple tax-
ation. Insofar as the serviceman is concerned, however, he is com-
pletely exempt from personal property tax upon his non-commercial
property in the state of temporary residence.
In order to ease the burdens of multiple taxation upon depend-
ents and also permit the state of temporary residence to impose an
equitable tax upon tangible personal property of the serviceman,
it is proposed that a uniform statute be enacted by the states whereby
tangible personal property would be taxed by only one state or in the
alternative could be taxed by more than one state if the tax were pro-
rated among the taxing states. Upon the enactment of such a uniform
statute, it is proposed that Congress amend section 514 to permit
the state wherein the serviceman is residing to tax his tangible personal
property.
C. Intangible Personal Property Tax
Under the prevailing rule, the situs of intangibles for purposes
of taxation is at the domicile of the owner, except in the case of in-
tangibles which have acquired a business situs in another state. In-
tangibles which acquire a business situs in a state other than the
state of domicile can, depending upon the breadth of the state statutes
involved, be taxed by both the state of domicile and the state where
the business situs exists. This situation, however, is rare. Most intan-
gibles owned by servicemen and their dependents are taxable only
by the state of domicile. In addition, intangible personal property, as
a source of revenue, does not occupy as important a place as other
sources of revenue which have been considered. Accordingly, the prob-
lems of multiple taxation and the proper distribution of tax revenue
do not occupy a position of great importance in this field of taxation.
As the search for additional revenue is intensified, however, it may
be that states will broaden the basis for taxing intangibles from domi-
cile to residence.
Until such time as intangibles become the subject of more active
taxation, however, amendments to federal and state statutes are not
deemed necessary.
